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abstract
We investigate the dealer model – an artificial market model based on deter-
ministic agents both numerically and theoretically. The agents refer to the past
market prices and changes their ask/bid price. The temporal development of
the market price fluctuations is calculated numerically. A probability density
function of the market price changes has power law tails. Autocorrelation co-
efficient of the changes has an anti-correlation, and autocorrelation coefficient
of squared changes (volatility correlation function) has a long time correlation.
A probability density function of intervals between two successive transactions
follows a geometric distribution. The GARCH type stochastic process is approx-
imately derived from the market changes of the model in a limit case. We discuss
two factors of the market price fluctuations and display a relation between the
volatility of the market prices and a demand-supply curve. We conclude that the
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power law tails and the long time volatility result from both positive and negative
heterogenous feedbacks in the agents.
keywords: artificial market model, GARCH type stochastic process, power-law
distribution, volatility clustering, econophysics
1 Introduction
Economically motivated problems are attracting the attention of physicists, economists
and engineers. Recently physicists have become interested in these problems
and established a new field, “econophysics”, which has been made tremendous
progress since 1997. The price fluctuation is one of the most exciting interests in
econophysic [1, 2, 3, 4]. Statistical properties of market price fluctuations were
clarified from analyzing financial time series empirically. Specifically we focus
on two statistical properties of price fluctuations; (1) the probability distribution
(pdf) of price changes has fat tails [?], and (2) the squared or absolute price
changes have long time correlation, which is well-known as the volatility clus-
tering [6]. The volatility clustering is measured by autocorrelation function of
squared or absolute price changes, the volatility autocorrelation function, which
has a long tail when the volatility is clustered.
On one hand stochastic models have been proposed in order to describe these
phenomena. For example, the truncated Le´vy flights [5, 7], the random mul-
tiplicative processes [8, 9, 10] and the GARCH models [11, 12]. On the other
hand, various agent-based models have been proposed in order to explain the
basic properties of price fluctuations from the viewpoint of complex dynamical
systems. These studies are called a agent-based approach [13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
The first agent-based model of a market was introduced by one of the au-
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thors (H.T.) et. al. in order to explain why market price apparently fluctuate
randomly [18]. It was shown that trading involve a kind of likely nonlinear in-
teraction among agents in general. A pseudo-random walk fluctuation of market
price results from the effect of chaos in an artificial market. That is verified in
the market that includes only 3 agents with very simple deterministic strategies.
Also, it was pointed out that when the agents have the tendency of following the
latest market trend, large fluctuations such as crashes or bubbles occur sponta-
neously. The market model is a variant of the deterministic agent-based model.
Bak et. al. investigated a stock market model with ”rational traders” and
“noise traders”. Noise traders’ actions depend on their current volatility in the
market and imitate ways to buy or sell. Rational traders optimize their own
utility functions. They emphasize that it is important for noise traders to exist
in order to have fat tails of the pdf [13]. Lux et. al. investigated a stochas-
tic multi-agent model with the pool of traders divided into fundamentalists and
noise traders [15]. They reported that a pdf of returns in their model has fat
tails. These models assume that a market has a balance of demand and supply
at a unit time to decide the next market price, and the market price changes de-
pending on an unbalance of the demand and supply. Unlike the stochastic model
of Lux stimulative extensions to the basic Minority Game (MG), multi-agent
market models without noise trader, have been developed and are successively
investigated [16, 17]. In fact these studies demonstrate the stylized facts (the
fat tails of the pdf of market price changes and the volatility clustering) and the
numerical results show that the model contains the GARCH properties. However
the GARCH process was analytically approximated in these studies.
Specifically GARCH model are useful tools in econometrics. However there
are few studies that give the theoretical basis of the GARCH from microscopic
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viewpoint. The aim of the present article is that we develop an artificial model
characterized by a few parameters and directly derive the GARCH type stochastic
process from a price change of the model. In our preceding study we proposed a
dynamical model of a market having mean field interactions of the dealers [19].
We derived a Langevin equation with both positive and negative feedbacks in
a stochastic manner for market prices and, the pdf of time interval between
successive trading follows exponential decay. But autocorrelation function of the
squared change does not have a long time correlation. In the present article we
introduce heterogeneity of the dealers instead of the mean-field interaction in our
preceding study.
The present article is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we introduce an artificial
model of a market based on deterministic agents who modify their ask/bid price
depending on past price changes. In Sec. 3 the statistical properties of artificial
market price fluctuations from numerical simulations are shown. In Sec. 4 we
show how the GARCH type stochastic process for the market price changes is
theoretically derived from the market model in a limit manner. The GARCH type
stochastic process is a familiar model for time series analysts but its theoretical
basis in microscopic viewpoint has not been clarified yet. In Sec. 5 we discuss
the volatility clustering demonstrated from numerical simulation in the model
comparing with the demand and supply curves of the market. Sec. 6 is devoted
to concluding remarks.
2 Market model
We show a brief explanation of the dealer model – an artificial market model
with many simple deterministic dealers [20]. The fundamental idea of the model
is an interaction between agents (dealers) through a common board and histor-
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ical market prices. We consider a market in which N dealers exchange a single
commodity, for example, in foreign currency market. We assume that the dealers
have limited information due to a short time trading. It takes a finite time for
them to decide to buy or sell. Therefore they have each simple strategy to predict
the next market price from the limited information. By the same token we do not
assume that they have utility function since they cannot optimize their action in
short time. Dealers put a sell/buy order on the market. By a competitive mech-
anism in the market adequate orders are selected, and the next market price is
determined from the ordered price.
As shown in fig. 1 we explain the dealer model for two parts: (1) a market
rule, which describes how to determine a market price from orders, (2) a strategy
of the agent, which governs how to order a sell/buy into the market and how to
modify their ask/bid prices. In the following subsections we explain a market
rule, a strategy of the agent, initial conditions and parameters.
2.1 Market rule
A market has a competitive mechanism for orders. We assume that N dealers
put their order (sell/buy) to a common board. Here pi(t) represents an ask/bid
price of the ith dealer at time t. The ask prices and the bid prices individually
compete in the market. Namely the maximum buying price and the minimum
selling price are effective in the market. Thus the condition for a trading to occur
is given by the following inequality,
max
for all buyers
{p(t)} ≥ min
for all sellers
{p(t)}, (1)
where the right hand side represents the maximum bid price for all the buyers,
and the left hand side represents the minimum ask price for all the sellers. As-
sume that the market price P (t) is determined as an arithmetic mean of the buy
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price and the sell price when trading occurs. Otherwise the last market price is
maintained. Namely,
P (t) =


1
2
(max{p(t)}
for all buyers
+min{p(t)}
for all sellers
) (max{p(t)}
for all buyers
≥ min{p(t)}
for all sellers
)
P (t− 1) (max{p(t)}
for all buyers
< min{p(t)}
for all sellers
)
. (2)
2.2 Strategy of the dealer
In general a dealer determines his/her action from several causes. The causes are
separated into “endogenous” factors and “exogenous” ones. The endogenous ones
mean what has happened in the market and contains the historical market prices
and a rumor in the market. The exogenous ones mean what has happened out-
side market, a balance of domestic commerce or international commerce among
countries and so on. Here we consider that the dealer has to make a decision
based on the market price fluctuations since they regards only prices for a short
period and determine their action and ask/bid price.
Here we consider a trade between a seller and a buyer. Suppose that the both
must make a trade. Then the seller decreases his/her sell price a little bit unless
he/she can make a trade. On the other hand the buyer increases his/her buy
price a little bit. Repeating this they find a satisfying exchange price.
The same is consistent in the market. Sellers go on decreasing their sell
price a little bit until they can sell and buyers go on increasing their buy price
until they can buy. From the assumption a modification of the ask/bid price is
negative/positive for sellers/buyers. The temporal development of the ask/bid
price can be described by,
pi(t + 1) = pi(t) + αi(t)Di(t), (3)
αi(t) represents the i’th dealer’s modification per a unit time step, andDi(t) = −1
when the ith dealer is a seller, and Di(t) = 1 a buyer.
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Moreover we assume that a value of modification depends on the past market
prices due to limited information. The assumption means that the next action
of dealers is only affected by the historical data of market prices.
αi(t) = α(P (t), P (t− 1), . . .) (4)
We assume that the dealers are sensitive to price changes rather than exact prices.
One of the simplest modification algorithms is a linear inner product of dealer-
dependent coefficients and past price changes. Namely the modification αi(t) is
described by
αi(t) = |1 +
T∑
s′=1
ci,s′∆Pprev(s
′)|ai, (5)
where ∆Pprev(s
′) denotes the s′th change of the past market price. It is obvious
that ∆Pprev(1) is the latest market price change. ci,s′ represents coefficients of
the ith dealer for the last s′th market price change, ai is a positive coefficient.
For simplicity we consider the case of T = 1. Then a rule to modify dealers’
expectation price is written by
pi(t + 1) = pi(t) + |1 + ci∆Pprev(1)|aiDi(t), (6)
where ci is a coefficient, which corresponds to accelerating and deaccelerating
his/her modification of expectation price depending on the latest price. After the
large price change each dealer goes up or goes down quickly his/her expectation
price in order to make his/her portfolio balanced as soon as possible.
We assume that the dealers open a sell/buy position till they exchange. They
determine whether they open the sell/buy position after they have made a trade.
We assume that the sellers want to go on selling when the market price goes up
and that the buyers want to go on buying when the market price goes down.
Therefore after trading the commodity the two dealers who have exchange
open either a sell position or a buy position depending on the past price change
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∆Pprev. If the market price goes up then the dealers may expect to make a profit
from selling the commodity. Hence we assume that they open the buy position,
i.e., Di(t+ 1) = −1, when ∆Pprev > 0. In striking contrary we assume that they
open the buy position, i.e., Di(t + 1) = 1 when ∆Pprev < 0 in order to make
a profit from future selling the commodity. Furthermore they open either a sell
position or a buy position at the same probability p = 1/2 when ∆Pprev = 0.
Moreover we assume that dealers have difference between the market price
and the retried ask/bid price, which denotes Λi(≡ P (t) − pi(t)). In a mind of a
dealer it is clear that the retried ask price is greater than the market price. On
the other hand the retried bid price is less than the market price. Therefore the
ask/bid price of the ith dealer at t is written by,
pi(t) = P (t)−D(t+ 1)Λi (7)
For simplicity Λi = Λ for the all dealers.
2.3 Initial conditions and parameters
Each dealer has two coefficients: ai and ci. ai and ci are initially given by uniform
random numbers distributed in interval [0, a∗] and [−c∗, c∗], respectively. These
coefficients exhibit dealer’s personality and are fixed throughout a numerical sim-
ulation. Each dealer has two variables: Di(t) and pi(t). Initial condition Di(0)
is given by either +1 or −1 randomly, i.e. a probability for Di(0) to be 1 is 1/2,
and a probability for Di(0) to be −1 is 1/2. Then pi(0) is given by P0 − Λ when
Di(0) = 1 and P0+Λ when Di(0) = −1, where P0 is an initial market price fixed
as P0 = 120.0 throughout simulations.
We assume that the latest price change ∆Pprev is initially zero. The dealer’s
rule is deterministic except initial conditions. This model has four parameters;
amount of the dealers N , a∗ for ai, difference between the ask/bid price and the
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market price Λ and c∗ for ci. Finally we summarize the model parameters in Tab.
1.
3 Numerical simulation
Fixing parameters N = 100, Λ = 1.0 and changing c∗ and a∗, we numerically
simulate the dealer model introduced in the above section. Figs. 2 and 3 show a
typical example of time series of market prices P (t) and of price changes ∆P (t) =
P (t)−P (t−1). The market prices and their changes apparently fluctuate although
the model is completely deterministic. The reason is high-dimensionality of the
system as the freedom of the system is proportional to the agent-number.
Let τs denote the time when the sth trade occurs. Fig. 4 exhibits a conceptual
illustration of market price fluctuations. The time series may be characterized by
a price change and a time difference between successive trading. P (τs) represents
a market price at τs. ∆ps denotes a price change at τs, namely, ∆ps ≡ P (τs) −
P (τs−1), and ns a time difference between successive trading, ns ≡ τs − τs−1.
Fig. 5 displays semi-log plots of pdfs of ∆ps for various values of a
∗ and c∗.
The pdfs seem to have fat tails and their tails depend on the values of both a∗
and c∗. The corresponding cumulative distribution function (cdf) is defined as,
F (≥ |x|) =
∫ −|x|
−∞
f(x′)dx′ +
∫ ∞
|x|
f(x′)dx′, (8)
where f(x) is a pdf. If the pdf follows power-law distribution the corresponding
cdf is given by
F (≥ |x|) ∝ |x|−β, (9)
where β is a power law exponent (β > 0), which is estimated from a slope of the
cdf in the double-log scale. As shown in fig. 6 the power law exponent depends on
the value of both c∗ and a∗. For large a∗ and c∗ the power law exponent becomes
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small. Moreover let be κ ≡ a∗c∗. Then the power law exponent β is a function
of κ as shown in fig. 7. We discuss why the power law exponent depends on κ in
the next section.
Typical example of time series of ns and its pdf are shown in fig. 8, respec-
tively. The pdf can be approximated by a geometric distribution,
W (n) = p(1− p)n (10)
This means that occurrence of trading is fully random. By numerical fitting in fig.
8 (right) we obtain p = 0.36. From analysis of high-frequency financial data it is
clarified that the pdf trading intervals at the same time is fitted by exponential
distribution [21].
4 Stochastic approximation as the GARCH pro-
cess
Here we consider why the pdf of the price changes has fat tails and that its tail
index depends on the parameter both a∗ and c∗. We will show that the market
price is approximately dominated by the GARCH process through this section.
As shown by the numerical simulations the market price fluctuates discontin-
uously. Here we consider ∆ps, a change of the market price on the sth transaction
as shown in fig. 4. Let Ms denote the buying price at the sth transaction, and
ms the selling price as shown in fig. 9. From the definition P (τs) =
1
2
(Ms +ms)
and ∆ps = P (τs)− P (τs−1), we get
∆ps =
1
2
(Ms +ms)−
1
2
(Ms−1 +ms−1)
=
1
2
(Ms −Ms−1) +
1
2
(ms −ms−1). (11)
From eq. (6) the next buyer at τs−1 adds |1 + cj∆ps−1|aj into his/her bid price
ns times until he/she can trade, and the next seller also subtracts |1+ ci∆ps−1|ai
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from his/her ask price ns times. Hence the first term and the second term in eq.
(11) are given by
Ms −Ms−1 = |1 + cj∆ps−1|ajns−1 −Ks, (12)
ms −ms−1 = ks − |1 + ci∆ps−1|ains−1, (13)
where the subscript j represents the dealer who gives the highest bid price at the
time τs, and i represents the dealer who gives the lowest ask one. Ks represents
a difference of the bid prices between the (s − 1)th buyer and the sth buyer at
τs−1, and ks of the ask prices between the (s− 1)th seller and the sth seller.
Substituting eqs. (13) and (12) into eq. (11) yields
∆ps =
1
2
|1 + cj∆ps−1|ajns−1 −
1
2
|1 + ci∆ps−1|ains−1 +
1
2
(ks −Ks). (14)
Since the dealer number N is large we assume that {c} and {a} are mutu-
ally independent stochastic variable, which is uniformly distributed in intervals
[−c∗, c∗] and [0, a∗]. Therefore we have 〈c〉 = 0, 〈c2〉 = c∗2/3, 〈a〉 = a∗/2 and
〈a2〉 = a∗2/3. Moreover since the sellers and the buyers are symmetric ks−Ks is
also symmetric. Actually it is easily confirmed by a numerical simulation. Fig.
11 (left) is a typical example of time series of ks−Ks. It is obvious that ks−Ks
is symmetric. Therefore 〈ks −Ks〉 = 0.
By taking conditionally averaging eq. (14) over dealers’ indices i and j we
have,
〈∆ps〉 = 0. (15)
By taking square of eq. (14) and averaging over dealers’ indices i and j under
the condition that ∆ps−1 is realized, we get
〈∆p2s〉 =
1
4
〈(ks −Ks)
2〉+
1
4
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|
2〉〈a2〉〈n2s〉
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+
1
4
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|
2〉〈a2〉〈n2s〉 −
1
2
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|〉〈|1 + c∆ps−1|〉〈a〉
2〈n2s〉
=
1
4
〈(ks −Ks)
2〉+
1
2
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|
2〉〈a2〉〈n2s〉 −
1
2
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|〉
2〈a〉2〈n2s〉. (16)
The first term in the left hand side of eq. (16) is not constant. ks −Ks has
large fluctuations. Fig. 11 (right) is the pdf of ks − Ks. The pdf is the same
distribution as ∆p. Hence we assumed that 〈(ks − Ks)
2〉 is proportional to a
conditional variance of ∆ps−1, namely
1
4
〈(ks −Ks)
2〉 = η〈∆p2s−1〉, (17)
where η is a positive coefficient. The second term in the left hand side of eq. (16)
is calculated as,
1
2
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|
2〉〈a2〉〈n2s〉 =
a∗2
6
〈n2s〉+
a∗2c∗2
18
∆p2s−1〈n
2
s〉. (18)
The third term in the left hand side of eq. (16) is calculated as,
1
2
〈|1 + c∆ps−1|〉
2〈a〉2〈n2s〉 =
{
a∗2
32
( 1
c∗∆ps−1
+ c∗∆ps−1)
2〈n2s〉 (|∆ps−1| ≥ 1/c
∗)
a∗2
32
〈n2s〉 (|∆ps−1| < 1/c
∗)
.
(19)
Therefore by using σ2s = 〈∆p
2
s〉 − 〈∆ps〉
2 (16) is described as,
σ2s =
{
ω1 + ησ
2
s−1 + ρ1∆p
2
s−1 + γ
1
∆p2
s−1
(|∆ps−1| ≥ 1/c
∗)
ω2 + ησ
2
s−1 + ρ2∆p
2
s−1 (|∆ps−1| < 1/c
∗)
, (20)
where ω1 ≡
5
48
a∗2〈n2s〉, ρ1 ≡
7
288
κ2〈n2s〉, γ ≡
a∗2
32c∗2
〈n2s〉, ω2 =
1
24
a∗2〈n2s〉 and ρ2 ≡
1
18
κ2〈n2s〉. From eq. (10) we obtain 〈n
2
s〉 =
(2−p)(1−p)
p2
≈ 2.92
For large |∆ps−1| the term γ
1
∆p2
s−1
of eq. (20) is almost zero. Then eq. (20) is
approximated as a GARCH(1,1) process. The probability density function of the
GARCH(1,1) process has fat tail [22, 23]. The power law exponent is a function
of σ1 and η. Namely the power law exponent depends on κ. Furthermore if κ is
small then the second term of eq. (20) vanishes, and we obtain σ2s = ω2 + ησ
2
s−1.
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The result of the iteration is given by,
σ2s →
σ20
1− η
+
ω2η
(1− η)2
(s→∞). (21)
Namely the variance of ∆ps is nearly constant. Then ps behaves similarly to a
Brownian motion.
5 Discussion
5.1 Correlation function
We calculate an autocorrelation coefficient of the market price changes and one of
squared changes. The volatility clustering is the well-known fact that the squared
changes of the market price are clustering in financial data. It is indicated that
the volatility clustering is related to a long time correlation of the market [6].
These two autocorrelation coefficients are defined by
R(1)s =
〈∆pt+s∆pt〉 − 〈∆pt+s〉〈∆pt〉
〈∆p2t 〉 − 〈∆pt〉2
, (22)
R(2)s =
〈∆p2t+s∆p
2
t 〉 − 〈∆p
2
t+s〉〈∆p
2
t 〉
〈∆p4t 〉 − 〈∆p
2
t 〉2
. (23)
As shown in fig. 10 (left) the autocorrelation coefficient is negative at small s. It
means that the price change tends to move to an opposite direction of the last
price change. On the other hand autocorrelation coefficient of the squared change
in fig. 10 (right) has a long time correlation. It is interesting that the volatility
of price changes has long time correlation although each dealer just depends on
the latest price change. Actually it is reported that the volatility ocorrelation
function of the GARCH(1,1) process decreases exponentially [24]. However that
is only true when a ARCH(1) parameter plus a GARCH(1) parameter is less than
or equal to 1. When the ARCH(1) parameter plus the GARCH(1) parameter is
greater than 1 it is impossible to derive the autocorrelation function in the same
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analytical way. From numerical simulations of the pure GARCH(1,1) process
we confirm that the autocorrelation function has long tail when the ARCH(1)
parameter plus the GARCH(1) parameter is greater than 1. Specifically its long
tail is significant when the GARCH(1) parameter is near 1. Hence we can explain
from this property that the market price fluctuations of the dealer model exhibits
the volatility clustering when η + ρ1 > 1 and η is near 1.
5.2 Demand and Supply curve of the model
In the model introduced in the article we treat the case that demand and supply
are automatically balancing, so that the total number of both sellers and buyers
is conserved. We introduce time-dependent density of buyers and sellers for a
market price P at time t, d(P, t) and s(P, t), respectively [25]. The cumulative
frequency distributions of sellers and buyers D(P, t) and S(P, t) are respectively
defined by
D(P, t) =
∫ P
0
d(P ′, t)dP ′ (24)
S(P, t) =
∫ ∞
P
s(P ′, t)dP ′. (25)
Of course in practical markets numbers of sellers and buyers can be observed
partially. However in the numerical simulation one can calculate them from all
the dealers’ variable. Here we consider relation between volatility and a demand-
supply curve. Fig. 12 shows D(P, t)− S(P, t) in high volatility regime (A) and
in low volatility one (B). It is found that a slope of D(P, t)− S(P, t) in the high
volatility regime is gradual. On the other hand one in the low is rapid. This
means that a slope of D(P, t) − S(P, t) is related to the volatility. Hence the
volatility clustering is attributed to gradually changing of the demand-supply
curve.
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5.3 Amount of sellers and amount of buyers
In the model the seller and buyer who have exchanged commodity open his/her
position depending on the latest price change after they make a trade. We assume
that the sellers go on selling when the market price goes down and that the buyers
go on buying when the market price goes up. Let be NS and NB represent an
amount of the sellers and one of buyers. Then NS −NB fluctuates around zero.
The reason is as follows: When NS −NB > 0 the market price tends to go down.
When NS−NB < 0 it goes up. However when the market goes down NS decreases
and NB increases. NS−NB becomes less than zero. When the market price goes
up NS increases and NB decreases. NS − NB becomes greater than zero. If the
sellers/buyers go on selling/buying when the market price goes up/down then a
crash/bubble occurs. Throughout both the GARCH process and the demand and
supply we think that there are two reasons why the market price fluctuates. One
results from rules of a dealers’ prediction depending on the past market price.
Another results from unbalancing of demand and supply.
6 Conclusion
We introduced the dealer model in which a commodity is exchanged such as
a foreign exchange market. The model generates the time series statistically
similar to real financial one although the model has a few parameters. This
means that the model contains primitive factor for the market price fluctuations.
The probability density function of the artificial price changes has power law
tails. The autocorrelation function of the changes has anti-correlation for a few
ticks. This implies that the market price changes tend to move in opposite. A
squared autocorrelation function (volatility correlation function) has a long tail
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although the dealers depend on the latest price change. We derived the GARCH
process for price changes under the assumption that the dealer homogeneously
trades irrespective of their coefficients i.e. we can take average of ∆p2s over all the
dealers’ indices. From the GARCH(1,1) limit we explained the power-law of the
probability density function and the long time correlation of volatility correlation
function. The long time correlation of volatility can be also seen in a demand-
supply curve. The slope of the demand-supply curve is gradual in high volatility
regime. In contrary the slope of demand-supply curve is rapid in a low volatility
case. We guess that the market price fluctuations result from both the dealers’
prediction depending on the past market prices and unbalancing of demand and
supply.
The relation between microscopic behavior of dealers and macroscopic feature
of a market will be bridged by statistical mechanics. Then the intriguing prob-
lem is to clarify what kind of microscopic interaction between dealers generate
statistical feature of macroscopic variables.
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Table 1: Model parameters; N , a∗, Λ and c∗.
parameter detail
N amount of the dealers
a∗ a prediction coefficient ai
Λ difference between retried ask/bid price and the market price.
c∗ for a prediction coefficient ci
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market market price
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       actions 
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N=100,T=1,a*=0.01,Λ=1.0,c*=375.0
Figure 1: The conceptual illustration of the dealer model. The inputs of the
market are orders from dealers. The output of the market is a market price. The
input of an agent is a sequence of past price changes. The output of an agent is
a sell price or a buy price.
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Figure 2: A typical example of time series of market prices at N = 100, a∗ = 0.01
and Λ = 1.0 for c∗ = 0.0(right) and 375.0(left).
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Figure 3: A typical example of time series of price changes at N = 100, a∗ = 0.01
and Λ = 1.0 for c∗ = 0.0(left) and 375.0(right).
∆ps
ns
∆ps+1
∆ps-1
τ s-1 τs+1τs
P( )τs+1
P( )τs
P )(τ s-1
M
a
rk
e
t 
P
ri
ce
Time
ns+1
Figure 4: A conceptual illustration of a market price fluctuation. A trading
occurs at random. τs represents the time when the sth trading occurs. P (τs)
exhibits a market price at τs, ∆ps a market price change at τs, namely ∆ps =
P (τs)− P (τs−1), and ns a difference between τs−1 and τs, ns ≡ τs − τs−1.
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Figure 5: Semi-log plots of the probability density functions of the price changes
∆ps. We fix N = 100, Λ = 1.0 and a
∗ = 0.01, and change a∗ (left). We fix
N = 100, Λ = 1.0 and c∗ = 100.0, and change a∗ (right).
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Figure 6: Log-log plots of the cumulative distribution function of the price
changes ∆ps. We fix N = 100, Λ = 1.0 and a
∗ = 0.01, and change a∗ (left).
We fix N = 100, Λ = 1.0 and c∗ = 100.0, and change a∗ (right).
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Figure 7: Log-log plots of the cumulative distribution functions of the price
changes ∆ps at κ = 3.8 and κ = 3.7. It shows the cumulative distribution
functions at three different parameter sets for each κ.
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Figure 8: A typical example of time series of an interval between successive
trading ns (left) and its probability distribution function in semi-log scale (right).
Parameters are fixed at N = 100, a∗ = 0.01, Λ = 1.0 and c∗ = 375.0.
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Figure 9: A conceptual illustration for explaining dealers interaction between
τs−1 and τs. Ms represents a buy price at τs, and ms a sell price. The Next buyer
at τs−1 adds |1 + cj∆ps−1| into his/her bid price ns times, and the next seller
subtracts |1 + ci∆ps−1| from his/her bid price ns times.
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Figure 10: Autocorrelation coefficient of price changes (left) and Autocorrelation
coefficient of squared price changes (right) are calculated from temporal develop-
ment of price changes. Parameters are fixed at N = 100, a∗ = 0.01, Λ = 1.0 and
c∗ = 375.0.
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Figure 11: A typical example of time series of ks − Ks at N = 100, a
∗ = 0.01,
Λ = 1.0 and c∗ = 375.0 (left). The pdf of ks−Ks and ∆ps at the same parameters
(right).
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Figure 12: A difference between cumulative frequency distribution D(P, t) and
S(P, t). Capital A exhibits a high volatility regime, and B a low volatility one.
Parameters are fixed at N = 100, a∗ = 0.01, Λ = 1.0 and c∗ = 375.0.
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